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Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the
Export Control Area
John L. Ellicott*
A

disclaimer that I have to make at the beginning is that I am one
quarter Canadian; moreover, on this issue, as you will probably find
out, I am about 99 % Canadian. So I am not sure how much disagreement we are going to be able to stir up, at least on the issue of the U.S.
embargo of Cuba, which I think both of us are going to say something
about.
Back in February of 1992, Bill Clinton was making a campaign
appearance in Miami. At that time, Florida was regarded as a key
swing state in the election; it was not clear which way it would go. It
was one of four or five major swing states and it was very important to
carry Florida.
Either President Clinton or one of his advisors decided that now
was the time for Bill Clinton to endorse something called the Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA), which was the principal legislative goal of a
group called the Cuban American National Foundation. That Foundation is a potent force in Florida politics. It speaks, or purports to speak,
for a substantial Cuban refugee community in south Florida and it also
donates very generously to certain key Congressmen in a number of
other states, including Representative Robert Toricelli of New Jersey, a
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
One of the key features of the Cuban Democracy Act was a provision to make the U.S. embargo of Cuba effectively extraterritorial in
the sense that it would command subsidiaries of U.S. companies
outside the U.S. to observe the embargo. That particular provision,
which was known as the Mack Amendment, for Senator Connie Mack
of Florida, had been pending in Congress for about two years before
the CDA came around. It was bitterly opposed by Canada, by the
United Kingdom, by the European Community and various other foreign countries. President Bush had said that he would veto the Mack
Amendment, if it was put into any legislation that came to his desk. In
fact, he did veto the Export Administration Act of 1991, partly on that
ground. To make a long story short, Mr. Clinton endorsed the Cuban
Democracy Act. At that point President Bush had a change of heart,
and he endorsed the Cuban Democracy Act. All the opposition was
swept away and it became law in October of 1992.
* Senior Partner, Covington & Burling.
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Before turning to some of the practical aspects of that development, let me just talk a little bit about the background of the extraterritorial features of U.S. trade controls, of which this is a classic example. What is it that makes U.S. export and transaction controls so
unpopular outside the United States? In a word, it is extraterritoriality,
a wonderful big word, which means in this context, that these laws
purport to apply to actions that take place outside the United States
and that do not involve nationals of the United States.
Well, what connection does the United States have with these actions? The answer is one of two things: First, either the products or the
technology that is involved in the transactions has some kind of connection to the United States; either the source was in the U.S., or the
products or technology contained something from the United States.
Or, second, one of the parties involved in the transaction, although foreign, is owned or controlled by U.S. interests.
When has the United States resorted to this kind of control? In
very general terms, the extraterritorial "product source controls," have
been broadly applied, and have not really occasioned a lot of controversy outside the United States. The other type, what I will call the
"entity controls," have been applied more spasmodically, but with a
great deal more controversy. I will say just a little bit more about the
"source" type controls, so that we are all sure we understand the
breadth of these.
The most typical case is that of so-called "reexports." In the context of Canada, this is a shipment out of Canada of goods that came to
Canada from the United States. The U.S. calls this a reexport and
asserts authority over it. It is not quite as bad as it might seem, because there are a lot of transactions involving those goods that the U.S.
considers permissive. In other words, you do not have to go in and ask
somebody in the U.S. government if you can do it if you are a Canadian company. For example, reexports out of Canada to all of Western
Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and certain other countries,
are permissive for virtually everything.
The controls become more troublesome when they reach beyond
what I call reexports to foreign, in this case Canadian, products that
have U.S. content in them - either materials or components. The U.S.
will apply its export controls to those transactions, in certain circumstances. For products generally, the U.S. will apply its controls if the
U.S. content is over a certain threshold percentage level. For most exports from Canada, that level is 25 %. And it is measured by the cost to
the Canadian producer of the U.S. content against the Canadian export
selling price. If you have mark ups and labor and so forth, the U.S.
content may be, in fact, as high as 50% on a materials test, but be
below 25 % on a cost basis. That is significant because, as I understand
it, the Canadian government has had a general policy, although I do
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not think it is written down, of deferring to U.S. export controls for
Canadian products that have more than 50% U.S. content. But, Canada compares the U.S. content with the Canadian content. It is a different kind of a test, so although the percentage numbers are different,
in practice the tests may often be very much the same.
The U.S. has further controls reaching even beyond product content to so-called "direct products" of U.S. technology. There may be no
U.S. content in the product, but some U.S.-source technology was used
to make the product. That control has been exerted only in the area of
national security, and only to target exports to certain "controlled
countries"; this is something left over from the Cold War, basically
dealing with exports to Russia, China, and Eastern Europe.
When the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) still existed, the Canadians had a very parallel set of
controls, which I think remain in effect. So that the U.S. "direct product" controls really did not do any more than the Canadian controls
did, and that there was in fact a general exemption in the U.S. controls
for shipments out of Canada or other countries that participated in the
COCOM regime.
So, the U.S. extraterritorial "product source controls," I think,
have less of a problem in our relations with Canada and other countries. The "entity controls," as I mentioned, have been much more of a
problem. I will run through these quickly, with a little history by country, rather than cite a lot of regulations to you.
The first set of these controls effectively came in the wake of the
Korean War, and affected trade with North Korea and China. Vietnam
was added later, in the course of the U.S. involvement in that civil war.
These transaction controls applied to so-called "persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," a terrible term, because it includes
persons who are not in fact subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. The term "a person subject" is defined to include Canadian
companies and companies in other countries, in which U.S. interests
have a controlling ownership, or managerial control position. And so,
the United States told these "persons subject" that they could not trade
with these embargoed countries, even if the products were 100% nonU.S.
The controls did lead to some problems. There were conflicts with
Canada over the China controls that appeared episodically. A more serious episode arose with France that led a French court to place a U.S.
subsidiary in that country under a court receivership in order to prevent it from breaching a contract to supply truck bodies for delivery to
China. After President Nixon's trip to China, the U.S. removed China
from this embargo program and that potential conflict went away.
North Korea does not have significant international trade. It is basically a very isolated country. So, to my knowledge, we have not had
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similar conflicts, at least serious ones, with Canada or other countries
concerning transactions of U.S. subsidiaries with North Korea. Vietnam started to open up to international trade and investment in the
late 1980s, and there was a potential for significant conflict problems,
but the U.S. eased and finally dropped the Vietnam embargo early this
year.
Cuba was put under a regime very much like China and Vietnam,
but with a major difference in the original Cuba program, which dates
from when Castro turned communist shortly after the 1959 revolution.
Basically, in the early 1960s, there was an exception. "Persons subject"
was in the law, but there was an exception for trade transactions with
Cuba by "persons subject" outside the United States. The exception
applied if there was no participation by anybody in the U.S., and no
U.S. goods. This means the trade transaction had to be totally foreign.
Despite the exception, the U.S. did have some serious conflicts
with Canada and with certain of the Latin American companies that
began to build up in the 1970s. Then the decision was made to drop the
exception and set up a licensing regime under which even goods with
some U.S. content could be exported to Cuba. As it turned out, the
Treasury Department licensed just about everything. So potential conflicts with Canada and other countries seemed to go away, until the
Cuban Democracy Act. I will come back to that.
I will note here in passing that in the newer types of U.S. embargoes, beginning in about 1980, and starting with Iran and then proceeding on to Libya, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Haiti, Panama, and Nicaragua,
we have steered away from the "persons subject" concept and started
regulating "U.S. persons," a term defined to exclude U.S.-owned companies in foreign countries. So we stepped back from the extraterritorial approach that had stirred up these conflicts, except that some of
the regulators in Washington came up, over the years, with some pretty
extreme constructions of when U.S. companies were involved in subsidiary transactions. For example, if the parent company says to its subsidiary, it is okay to go ahead, the parent company, a U.S. person, has
violated the law. So the U.S. company has to be very careful not to do
that.
I might mention briefly that in the U.S. antiboycott program, we
do not call the regulated parties "persons subject." We call them "U.S.
persons," but we define that term to include foreign companies that are
controlled by U.S. firms. Having done that, however, we regulate conduct of U.S. persons only if such activities are in "U.S. foreign commerce." This is sort of a compromise. So far as I know the U.S. antiboycott program, although controversial in Canada, has not stirred up
too many real conflicts.
The last regulatory action I will mention in this general sector is
the 1982 U.S. pipeline controls, when the U.S. invoked the "persons
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subject" authority to stop the building of the Soviet natural gas pipeline into Western Europe. We did it at a time when all the governments of Western Europe were committed to providing equipment and
support for this pipeline, which they regarded as important economically for them.
When the U.S. tried to stop the building of the pipeline, after European equipment contracts had been signed, it kicked up a huge fuss
and almost destroyed the Atlantic Alliance. Fortunately, George Schultz came in as Secretary of State. He could see what was happening.
He advised President Reagan to drop the controls. The President took
this advice, thereby depriving all of us lawyers of the opportunity to
argue this important case in the Supreme Court.
Now, let me go back and say a few things about the Cuban Democracy Act, and how a U.S. company with a subsidiary in Canada
copes with it. The reason this has become difficult is not only that the
U.S. has gone backward and said: "No more licensing for U.S.-owned
Canadian companies, which are deemed 'persons subject' and bound by
this control," but Canada has put in a blocking order, basically saying:
"If you, a Canadian company, go along with the U.S. embargo, you are
violating Canadian law." So, we have a direct conflict between these
two regimes.
One thing that ought to be kept in mind, when you consider this
conflict, is a legal doctrine that is recognized in the United States (I
honestly do not know whether it is recognized in Canada or not. In this
case, I think it is more important that the doctrine is recognized in the
United States). It is the legal defense known as "foreign state compulsion." Essentially that defense means that a U.S.-owned Canadian
company operating in Canada that is under threat of Canadian prosecution if it does not proceed with a trade transaction with Cuba, may
have a legal defense in the U.S. courts to a charge that it has committed a violation of U.S. law by going forward with the Cuban transaction. The U.S. parent company does not have that defense, however. If
the U.S. company does anything to facilitate or authorize the Cuban
transaction, it is subject to prosecution. But the Canadian company,
exposed to Canadian law and subject to Canadian prosecution, may
have the foreign state compulsion defense. This defense has not been
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, but it is found in lower court
decisions. It is also in the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
and I think most of us feel that it probably is going to be upheld in
U.S. courts.
Let me add some practical comments about the legal exposure
that the U.S. parent company has and the legal exposure that the Canadian company has. First, the Treasury Department in the United
States, which enforces the embargo, is very likely to pick on the U.S.
company, rather than the Canadian subsidiary. It has personal jurisdic-
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tion over the U.S. company, and it is certainly going to find it to be the
most attractive enforcement target. Thus, from the standpoint of preventative U.S. law treatment, the most important patient is the U.S.
parent company.
Second, there are persuasive reasons why the Treasury would feel
it had to take enforcement action if a Canadian subsidiary were to go
ahead with a trade transaction with Cuba. The Cuban embargo has a
very strong political constituency. I have recited a little history earlier
to give you that flavor. It would be politically hazardous for any administrative agency to disregard the embargo proscriptions. So the Treasury Department is going to be strongly motivated to take some action.
Otherwise it is going to have Congress on its back and the Cuban refugee community on its back and so forth.
There are a number of legal theories that might be resorted to, in
order to pin the U.S. parent company, if a Canadian subsidiary goes
ahead with a Cuba transaction. Obviously, if there is any kind of transactional support, or any kind of approval, even perhaps a good-faith
failure to attempt to stop the transaction, the Treasury will use this to
implicate the U.S. parent. It is conceivable the Treasury will try theories of imputed liability, piercing the corporate veil, and will try to hold
the parent company liable per se, for what its Canadian subsidiary has
done. I think that would be moving beyond where the law is, particularly recognizing that this is a program for which there are criminal
sanctions.
Despite the fact that the embargo is very tight from the U.S.
standpoint, there are some exceptions in it which offer a potential way
out. The most significant that I can think of is an exception for preexisting contracts, which is being interpreted by the Treasury quite
generously to avoid conflicts with foreign blocking measures and trade
policies. So, if there is any factual basis on which you can argue a preexisting commitment, perhaps not even a formal contract, but an understanding or something like that, you may be able to avoid the problem by getting a license from the U.S. Treasury, to permit the Canadian subsidiary to fulfill its Cuban commitment.
There are also exceptions in the Cuban Democracy Act that permit Treasury licensing for exports of medicines, food, and certain telecommunication services. Again, depending on the particular situation,
it may be possible to persuade the Treasury Department to license
something by a Canadian company under one of these exceptions. So,
do not give up hope, just because you have an apparent legal conflict
between two nations; there may be an easy way out.
Now let us look at the Canadian side. I have no expertise in Canadian law, so everything I say can be contradicted and you should rely
on my co-speaker and not what I am saying. But, as I understand it, if
a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. company disregards the Canadian
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blocking order and rejects a Cuban order, it is potentially subject to
criminal prosecution in Canada. And there are some reasons why you
could expect that would occur. The Canadians made quite a public display of invoking this blocking order. The Cuban Democracy Act is
viewed in Canada, I believe accurately, as a U.S. infringement on Canadian sovereignty and if an important Cuban transaction came along
that presented the issue clearly, it would seem to me that the Canadian
government would be bound to use legal process to compel the Canadian subsidiary to go ahead.
In addition, there are notification obligations in the Canadian
blocking order that require Canadian companies, if they are given directives or orders, or perhaps even suggestions, to go along with the
U.S. embargo, to report it to the Canadian Attorney General. So the
government is going to know about such situations. Still, there are circumstances in which the Canadian government might exercise discretion, in a particular situation, to avoid a confrontation. There might be,
for example, situations in which it could be established that the proposed transaction was for some reason commercially not feasible or financially or otherwise attractive to the Canadian company: The price
could be wrong; the products may not fit; the customer's credit terms
may not be acceptable, etc. I do not know what the Canadian government would do if, for example, there were an alternative source of supply in Canada for an equivalent product. I do not know whether the
government would use its influence to arrange that the order be diverted to the other supplier.
There is a basis, I mentioned, in pre-1992 Canadian policy for deferring to U.S. trade controls in situations where the product is of U.S.
origin, or has more than 50 % U.S. content. Now, I do not know for a
fact whether the Canadian government would accept that as a situation
where it would defer to the U.S. embargo, notwithstanding the blocking order.
Another possible situation would be a Canadian subsidiary that is
subject to a parental territorial constraint that is totally independent of
the Cuba embargo, but excludes Cuba from the Canadian subsidiary's
sales territory. In many multi-national corporations, sales territories are
assigned to various units, and a Canadian company might be serving,
for example, Canada only, and so would not have any export sales. Or
it might be the practice of the American parent company that all Latin
American sales would be handled out of Mexico, for example, or perhaps out of the United States. Query whether the Canadian government would feel comfortable advising a Canadian subsidiary under
such conditions, if it got an order from Cuba, "You do not have to
deviate from your standard company policy to fill such an order." But
again, I caution, I am not a Canadian lawyer, none of what I said is
advice to be followed in any way. Ask your Canadian law/policy ques-
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tions to my fellow speaker.
Well, suppose there is no easy way out. You are advising an
American company with a Canadian subsidiary. The subsidiary has
been getting orders from Cuba in the past. What do you do to prepare
for the next such order? It seems to me it is very important for the
U.S. parent company, under such conditions, to give a very clear instruction to the Canadian subsidiary that any trade with Cuba would
violate U.S. law, in the absence of a license from the Treasury Department. Yes, that instruction will have to be notified to the Canadian
Attorney General, but my view is that that instruction should be given
to protect the parent company from any possible implication that it
tolerated or went along with Cuban trade.
Certainly, if any such trade is imminent, the U.S. parent company
should not do anything to help the Canadian company perform any
Cuban transaction. It should not provide any parts, components or
materials that might help the Canadian subsidiary to go forward. If the
U.S. company knows something with Cuba is going to happen, and it
does happen, the U.S. company must not be a part of it. That means,
of course, if you have a situation where there is a very close working
relationship between the management of the U.S. parent company and
the Canadian subsidiary, the U.S. company is likely to be in for
trouble. That is not a very good situation to be in from the standpoint
of this legal conflict. Finally, both companies had better get good legal
advice, and that may mean that there is a need for some U.S. legal
advice in Canada and some need for Canadian legal advice in the
United States.
I have worked with several Canadian law firms on this conflicts
problem. We have found it very useful to communicate directly between firms, because we can talk informally, without triggering the
kind of notification to the Attorney General that might be required if
parent companies and subsidiary companies were talking to each other.
I have also found that those conversations with Canadian counsel to be
very useful to understanding the Canadian perspective.
Now what does a Canadian subsidiary do to cope with the legal
conflict? It has to be in a position to minimize its own exposure and
hopefully its parent's exposure as well. I guess the first advice might be
to not go looking for trouble, i.e., one should not be beating the bushes
for Cuban business at this juncture. You have to talk to your Canadian
lawyer about how far you can refrain from normal marketing efforts
without transgressing the blocking order. But hopefully you do not have
to make trouble for yourself or for your parent company. The second
point is to keep a respectful distance in dealing with the U.S. parent.
You are going to make your own decisions in this matter; the parent
company is not going to be able to make them. It is probably best, if
the situation comes up, to let the two outside counsel communicate, and
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then let the Canadian counsel advise the Canadian company, and the
U.S. counsel advise the U.S. company.
We talked about the need under U.S. law for the U.S. parent to
send a written communication to the Canadian company. I would also
think it important for the Canadian company to inform the U.S. parent, if a Cuban transaction materializes. I do not think it is a good
idea, from a U.S. law perspective, to keep the U.S. parent company in
the dark. It is better for the U.S. parent to know if the situation is
coming, and to act intelligently. It is certainly not a good idea for the
U.S. company to withdraw any constraints, such as territorial limits
that already may exist, in terms of export business. As I mentioned
before, some companies have such territorial limits. I certainly would
not advise the U.S. company to change such limits or ease up on them,
because that would be asking for trouble, and maybe those limits would
stand up in Canada if a particular situation arose.
Obviously the Canadian company, in the last analysis, is going to
have to comply with Canadian law. I just do not think there is any way
around that. I do not think any parent company in the U.S. is going to
say to its Canadian company, "Okay, you guys all go to jail in Canada,
because we have got to protect the home office." That just is not the
way it is going to happen. If it really gets that hot, I think the Canadian company is going to make a decision to comply with Canadian
law, and if I were a Canadian company, I think that is the decision I
would make.
If an order does come in to a Canadian subsidiary, it should inform the U.S. company, and then get immediate legal advice. The first
thing to do is look and see if there is an out, either in Canada or in the
U.S. Is there something in the transaction that makes it licensable
under U.S. law? Perhaps it is a pre-existing contract, perhaps it is
medicine, food, or something else that can be licensed in the U.S. Certainly one must take advantage of a license opportunity, if one exists.
You are not going to have any defense of foreign state compulsion if
you had a license you could have gotten and did not seek it.
Next, look on the Canadian side, with the aid of Canadian counsel, and see if there is some way to avoid the confrontation there.
Third, it is important that the Canadian company, if it gets caught in a
real bind, and there is not a way out, to be able to demonstrate that it
did act under compulsion. There are various ways of doing that. You
might even consider going to the Attorney General or going into a Canadian court and asking if the transaction must go forward. At the very
least, you would, I think, be well advised to get an opinion of reputable
Canadian counsel, that says not only does Canadian law say you must
proceed but, if you do not do so, you are likely to be prosecuted in a
Canadian court. That is the kind of situation that would lend itself to
the defense of foreign state compulsion.
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Let me mention a couple of additional aspects. The U.S. embargo
is broadly construed. It does not apply only to exports from, say, Canada to Cuba by subsidiaries of U.S. companies in Canada. It can apply to transactions that go through several stages. For example, an order from Cuba comes in to some wholesale distributor in Canada. The
Canadian distributor places an order on a Canadian subsidiary of a
U.S. company. If that subsidiary goes forward knowing the product is
ending up in Cuba, it has a problem under the U.S. embargo. So this
embargo catches indirect as well as direct transactions with Cuba.
Second, the U.S. embargo reaches individual U.S. nationals, as
well as "persons subject," that we have been talking about that are
entities. Individual U.S. citizens who are officers or directors of a Canadian company are subject to the U.S. embargo. That is a very difficult situation, because those individuals, if they are resident in Canada,
are really subject to prosecution in both countries. I have found, in
some situations, that it was advisable to get separate counsel for such
individuals, if there was really likely to be trouble, because the only
answer for them might be to resign, and I do not want it said that their
resignation was caused by my U.S. client. I want any such decision to
be made by the individual himself.
Earlier on, we talked about the other side of U.S. extraterritorial
controls, that is the "product source" controls. Suppose a Canadian
subsidiary receives an order to sell a product to Cuba that has U.S.
content in it, or that is of U.S. origin. Two U.S. control schemes are in
play. I do not know if the defense of foreign state compulsion would
protect the Canadian subsidiary in the context of the Commerce Department "product source" control scheme. That could be the worst
situation you could have - a Canadian subsidiary with a U.S.-content
product, gets an order from Cuba - because the Canadian company is
potentially violating two laws. One is the Trading with the Enemy Act
under which the Cuban embargo exists - the one I have been talking
about based on entities. The other is the Export Administration Act,
which is the product source control scheme. The problem with the latter is that it has a remedy in it which is deadly, something called the
denial list. The Commerce Department can take a foreign company
and put it on the denial list. It is then out of business, because nobody
can deal with it who deals in U.S. goods, and that is fatal for almost
any company with U.S. connections. That is a terrible punishment, and
Commerce can impose it even though Commerce has no personal jurisdiction over the Canadian company.
Given the conflict of laws, why has there not been a big case, after
more than a year and a half? That is very disappointing for the legal
profession, although not for clients. Some of us thought this was going
to be another opportunity for a Supreme Court case, like the 1982
pipeline controls. I can only speculate on the absence of litigation. I
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would guess the first and foremost reason is that the Cuban economy
and foreign exchange position are so weak that there is very little
Cubans can buy abroad, including Canada. A second reason why conflicts may not yet have developed is the licensing provisions in U.S. law
that I mentioned, the licenses for pre-existing contracts, in particular.
Time must be about to run out for that provision, but I know in a
couple of situations that I have encountered, that licensing has saved
the day, so to speak. I have mentioned the other licensing exceptions
for food, medicine, and some telecommunications. Sometimes there are
transactions that offend the embargo that do not involve actual exports
to Cuba. Those the Treasury can still license, as I see it, and I think
the Treasury agrees. There are some possible escape hatches on the
Canadian side to which we have referred. That may also have helped
prevent conflicts.
I have a sense, although I must say the U.S. government people
that I have talked to have been very circumspect, that there has been a
serious effort by both countries to avoid provoking the conflict between
the U.S. embargo and the blocking order. I did not think that would be
the attitude when the conflict emerged in late 1992. I thought both
sides were spoiling for a fight. But there not having been such a fight
leads me to think that maybe some cooler heads have concluded perhaps that it is not in the overall interest of either country to bring this
to a head.
I would like to end by noting that the first conflict case I have had
did not arise in Canada. It came up in the United Kingdom. There is a
very parallel situation in the United Kingdom. There is a U.K. blocking law that is very similar to the Canadian one, and it has been invoked with an order responsive to the Cuban Democracy Act that is
quite similar to the Canadian blocking order. There is very little trade
between Great Britain and Cuba, but the British Department of Trade
and Industry takes British sovereignty very seriously.
We had a case involving a very small export of pharmaceutical
products to Mozambique from England. The English company was a
subsidiary of my U.S. client. The sale was to be financed under a letter
of credit that had been confirmed for the African customer by Havana
Bank International's London office. My client spotted this as a potential problem under the Cuban embargo, because the embargo does not
just prohibit dealing with Cuba; it prohibits dealing anywhere with any
Cuban party. And this bank was Cuban-owned; it was on the list of
"specially designated nationals" of Cuba that the Treasury Department
publishes. So the subsidiary could not legally go forward. The British
barrister that is with our London office went to see the Department of
Trade and Industry, and was asked, "Have you been to see the U.S.
Treasury?" And he said no. And they said to him "Well that is good,
because then we will talk to you." They explained: "Somebody else
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came in here a few weeks ago and they had seen the U.S. Treasury,
and we tossed them out."
So my barrister colleague said "Well, can you do something for
us?" They said, "Well we will consider issuing you a consent order."
My colleague thought that should solve the problem; DTI will consent
to the nonapplication of the blocking order so that the English company can go ahead and finance the transaction with some other bank.
There will not be any trouble under the U.S. embargo. But DTI said,
"Oh no, that is not what we mean by a consent order. A consent order
allows you to go talk to the U.S. Treasury and get them to back down."
Well, it took them ten days to issue such a consent order; it had to
go up to the Secretary of State of Great Britain, and apparently was
the first of its kind. But, of course, it did not solve anything in the
United States. Fortunately, because the transaction did not involve an
export to Cuba, we were able to get a license, somewhat grudgingly,
from the Treasury Department. This experience with the British conflicts situation tells me that there is really very little prospect of accommodation on the part of the British government if a real conflict arises
there over the U.S. embargo.

